



Protecting the Giant Pandas:  




We investigate newspaper censorship of firm-level negative news using a rare setting 
in which many companies were involved in similar tunneling scandals. We find that the 
Chinese censorship authorities restrict the dissemination of tunneling news on state-
owned enterprises, firms with greater numbers of employees, and large taxpayers. An 
examination of the difference in censorship behaviors between the central and 
provincial authorities reveal three incentives that direct the censorship practices: strong 
local protectionism, cross-provincial competition, and the concern for the relative 
positions in the political power system. Finally, we show that the tunneling news that 
is reported leads to negative market reactions and greater trading volumes, indicating 
that the news that survives the censorship has information content. 
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Protecting the Giant Pandas: Newspaper Censorship of Negative News  
1. Introduction 
The impact of the government on firms’ operations and information environment has been 
a subject of long-standing interest to researchers (e.g., Johnson and Mitton 2003; Leuz and 
Oberholzer-Gee 2006; Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell 2006; Fan, Wong, and Zhang 2007; 
Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven 2008; Calomiris, Fisman, and Wang 2010; Faccio and Hsu 2017). 
In particular, government protection of firms through censorship can reveal governments’ 
interests, intentions, and goals (King, Pan, and Roberts 2013). Although it is widely believed 
that censorship exists in many countries around the world and that it could potentially have a 
significant impact on market participants, little evidence exists regarding how censorship is 
conducted. Our study employs an interesting Chinese setting to attempt to open the black box of 
censorship and addresses three research questions. First, is censorship implemented for all 
negative news or is more focus given to news that involves specific types of firms? Second, is 
the censorship practice identical nationwide or is it affected by the power structures and 
incentives of different levels of governments? Third, concerning the economic consequences of 
censorship, does censorship block important news? We test this by examining whether negative 
news that survives the censorship (i.e., that is reported) has information content. 
Censorship is difficult to study because the censored news is unobservable. To address this 
issue, we make use of a rare setting in which many companies were involved in a similar type of 
scandal. Our premise is that, in theory, firms should get a similar level of news coverage for their 
scandals in the absence of censorship, after controlling for the extent of the problems and other 
firm-level characteristics that are expected to affect negative-news coverage. We attribute the 
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systematic difference in press coverage of the scandals to censorship. Jiang, Lee, and Yue (2010) 
show that large Chinese shareholders tunnel the listed companies using inter-corporate loans, 
and that such tunneling leads to serious economic consequences. 1  In 2006, the Chinese 
government declared such tunneling to be a crime that hampers the normal function of the capital 
markets and thus increases the financial risk.2 Government entities have motives to censor 
tunneling-related news because such tunneling severely affects firms’ operating and stock 
performance and reveals the controlling shareholders’ lack of credit and negligence of the 
interest of minority shareholders. Hence, media coverage of tunneling news can adversely affect 
the reputation of the tunneling firms and the central- and provincial-level governments if state-
owned controlling shareholders are involved. 
The advantages of our setting are that the tunneling mechanism is similar across firms and 
that the extent of tunneling is observable and measureable, making it possible for both the media 
to observe and report the news, and for us to control for the tunneling problems.3 China also 
provides a useful setting to study censorship given its political system. 
We follow Jiang et al.’s (2010) approach in identifying tunneling firms for 2001 to 2006. 
We read all the news articles related to these firms that were published from 2001 to 2009 in 
                                                             
1 Jiang et al. (2010) show that controlling shareholders use listed companies as cash machines: they borrow from 
listed companies and typically never pay back the principal and the interest. Such tunneling leads to significant 
economic consequences. For example, they show that the firms in the top other receivables deciles are significantly 
more likely to incur large losses and become candidates for delisting within two years compared to other firms. 
2 China’s State Council explicitly stated that inter-corporate-loan tunneling is criminal. For example, in its 2006 
(No. 128) announcement, China’s State Council stated that “The prevalence of large-shareholder occupying funds 
of listed firms seriously hampers firm development, affects the development of capital markets, and leads to losses 
and delisting of public companies. It is a crime that seriously damages the rights of companies and medium and 
small shareholders.” According to an anonymous government official at the Shenzhen Security Exchange, the 
presence of inter-corporate tunneling reduces the incentives for medium and small market participants to invest, and 
damages the capital market’s financing function. 
3 We also consider other settings such as the food-quality scandals (e.g., the poisonous-formula scandal in 2008). 
However, it is difficult to study those settings as the number of affected companies is small and the extent of the 
problem is not measurable. Also, in some scandals, the government bans all news dissemination if the news is 




439 newspapers, and we classify the news based on its content into tunneling-related, non-
tunneling negative, and non-negative news. We also classify the news into national-level and 
local-level news based on the readership of the newspapers. National-level refers to news 
published in national-level newspapers. For local-level news, which refers to articles published 
in local-level newspapers, we further classify them into in-province and out-of-province news: 
in-province (out-of-province) refers to news reported by local newspapers on firms located in 
the same (different) provinces as (from) the newspapers’ locations.4 
Our first set of tests show that censorship is not conducted equally for all tunneling firms. 
Instead, stronger protection is given to firms that are essential for the governments’ economic 
and social incentives: state-owned enterprises (SOEs), firms with large numbers of employees, 
and large taxpayers. Tunneling by state blockholders represents a crime committed by 
government entities and thus severely harms government reputation, creating strong censoring 
incentives for news involving SOEs. Firms with large numbers of employees are important since 
protecting employment and enhancing social stability is a crucial objective of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). One important aspect of such protection is through censorship of 
negative news related to these firms. Large taxpayers are essential for government fiscal income 
and their performance plays a crucial role in the promotion of local officials. To meaningfully 
compare firms with large numbers of employees or large taxpayers to their counterparts, we use 
propensity-score matching to identify otherwise-similar firms (including firm size and 
profitability) that differ significantly in the number of employees or the total income taxes paid. 
                                                             
4 Censorship can also be conducted at a level lower than the provincial level. We refer to the provincial or lower 
levels as provincial level for brevity. 
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We show that for the national-level newspapers, tunneling firms that are state-owned, with 
large numbers of employees, or paying more taxes, receive significantly fewer items of tunneling 
news than tunneling non-SOEs, smaller employers, or smaller taxpayers after controlling for the 
extent of tunneling and other factors that may affect coverage.5 Importantly, these firms also get 
a significantly smaller amount of other negative news, but do not differ from their counterparts 
in the likelihood of non-negative (either neutral or positive) news. Furthermore, we find that the 
protection of SOEs covers both central- and provincial-level SOEs, but mainly concentrates on 
large SOEs. 
In our second set of tests, we demonstrate that the censorship practice is not identical 
nationwide but differs systematically across different authorities in line with their political 
structures, and that these differences can be explained by local protectionism, cross-province 
competition, and the CCP power system. Perhaps most interestingly, unlike their national-level 
counterparts that give more protection to certain types of firms, provincial governments suppress 
all tunneling news on in-province public firms. The results highlight the strong impact of local 
protectionism: For a provincial government, all listed firms need to be protected given their 
significant influence on the local economy. 
In contrast, when local newspapers are reporting on firms headquartered in provinces outside 
of the newspaper’s province, we find that the protection only exists for central-level SOEs. The 
provincial censoring authorities do not protect firms located in other provinces (even if they are 
provincial-level SOEs) due cross-province competition. The fact that central-level SOEs are 
                                                             
5 The systematic differences in coverage could either be due to newspaper censorship by governments or to the 
newspapers’ reduced incentives to report protected firms in anticipation of censorship. We do not distinguish the 
two because they are both related to censorship. 
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protected reveals the concern for the relative position in CCP power system. Provincial-level 
governments need to be concerned about the significant positions of central SOEs in the CCP 
power structures (discussed in detail in Section 2.1); thus, out-of-province central SOEs are 
protected. 
Our third set of tests reveals significant capital-market impact of the tunneling news that 
survives the censorship. We find that reporting on tunneling leads to negative abnormal returns, 
greater abnormal trading volumes, and larger abnormal market depths. These results suggest that 
the protected firms benefit from the censorship through avoiding negative coverage that likely 
would have led to negative returns.6 
As explained, in our primary analyses we focus on tunneling news because our research 
design allows us to better capture the likelihood of a firm receiving coverage of tunneling 
problems. However, in additional analyses, we also descriptively investigate how the 
government selectively censors other types of negative news. We find evidence of censorship of 
negative news articles reporting on firms’ violations of laws and regulations, general corporate 
conditions, and shareholders’ disposals of equity. We do not find evidence of censorship related 
to bankruptcy and restructuring of financially distressed firms. Overall, these results imply that 
the censoring authorities focus on news related to firm reputation and future prospects, while 
they pay little attention to the news reporting on firms’ distress conditions as such issues tend to 
be relatively well-known. 
                                                             
6 Although we find (indirect evidence) that some firms benefit from the censorship, this does not imply that 
censorship is “good.” The protected firms avoid negative market reactions (at least temporarily), but this affects the 
fairness of the system for uninformed (small) investors and other firms. 
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Finally, we find that the official newspapers, often viewed as the CCP’s mouthpieces, have 
fewer incentives to follow tunneling events. However, they are also to some extent granted more 
rights to report on the protected companies. In contrast, commercial newspapers have higher 
incentives to report tunneling news, but they are restricted by the censorship and mostly follow 
the less-protected companies. 
Our paper offers several contributions. First, we add to the literature on government control 
over flow of information. Because of the difficulty to observe information control, prior literature 
employs various approaches, such as experimental (King, Pan, and Roberts 2014), analytical 
(Lorentzen 2014), using indirect evidence (Piotroski, Wong, and Zhang 2015), and descriptive 
(Qin, Stromberg, and Wu 2017). We provide direct evidence of newspaper censorship by 
employing a research design that allows us to partially “open up the black box” of government 
censorship. We provide rich evidence to enhance our understanding of the question of “how,” 
such as the selection of firms to be protected, the varied practices by different levels of authorities, 
the impact of the censorship, and the role of newspaper types. 
Second, by being the first to explore the different incentives of central- and provincial-level 
governments and their impact on censorship preferences, we contribute to the literature on how 
government structure and incentives affect the government’s role in the economy (e.g., Jones, 
Sanguinetti, and Tommasi 2000; Zhuravskaya 2000; Jin, Qian, and Weingast 2005; Li and Zhou 
2005). Our study highlights the important incentives that directs the censorship practices: (1) 
strong local protectionism - local governments protect their in-province “giant pandas;” (2) 
cross-provincial competition - they do not protect firms located in other provinces; (3) the 
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concern for power structures in CCP’s system – they need to censor the negative coverage of 
central-level SOEs. 
Third, we add to the literature on the media’s effect on firms and their information 
environment (Joe 2003; Miller 2006; Core, Guay, and Larcker 2008; Dyck, Volchkova, and 
Zingales 2008; Joe, Louis, and Robinson 2009; Kothari, Li, and Short 2009; Bushee et al. 2010; 
Liu and McConnell 2013; Drake, Guest, and Twedt 2014; Dai, Parwada, and Zhang 2015), and 
to the interesting recent studies on governments’ impact on the media (Piotroski, Wong, and 
Zhang 2016; You, Zhang, and Zhang 2017). Specifically, we document that the surviving 
tunneling news leads to negative abnormal returns, and increases trading volumes and market 
depths, thus showing the information content of a restricted category of news that is expected to 
be subject to the strictest censorship.  
Finally，our study extends extant research on the value of political connections (Roberts 
1990; Fisman 2001; Faccio 2006; Faccio and Parsley 2009; Chaney, Faccio, and Pasley 2010; 
Fisman and Wang 2015; Hope, Yue, and Zhong 2017). Though connections are not the focus of 
this paper per se, the protected firms in our study can be viewed as firms with government 
connections. We show that these firms benefit from censorship through avoiding negative 
coverage of large shareholders’ tunneling scandals and the associated turmoil in the stock market, 
highlighting an additional benefit of political connections not discussed in prior literature. 
  
2. Institutional Background and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Institutional Background 
The CCP has employed media censorship since the establishment of the People’s Republic 
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of China in 1949.7 Censorship is considered to be an important policy to enhance the party’s 
control and is conducted at both national and local levels. National-level newspapers, such as 
People’s Daily, are directly monitored by the CCP’s Publicity Ministry. Local newspapers are 
censored by the publicity departments at the provincial (or lower) levels. The censorship of 
newspapers has evolved with the rapid development of China’s economy. In the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, many new business newspapers were created, accompanied by a conglomeration 
wave that re-organized a number of national- and local-level newspapers, such as Guang Ming 
Daily and Guangzhou Daily, into large newspaper groups. 
Accompanied by the commercialization of newspapers, the CCP has also loosened the 
control of business news to some extent. For example, according to three anonymous 
interviewees, the publicity authorities normally do not control the dissemination of some day-to-
day business news, such as news related to negative stock returns of publicly traded firms, 
because such information could easily be acquired from the stock market.8 However, for news 
that could lead to social turbulence and economic instability and that could harm government 
reputation, the publicity authorities will “provide guidance” through telephone calls, letters, or 
face-to-face communication. For example, in the scandal of “Yunnan Fanya Non-Ferrous Metal 
Exchange” in 2015 (also known as “China’s Ponzi scheme”), all newspapers were advised not 
to cover related news. For other negative news, it is up to the different levels of publicity 
authorities and newspaper editors to decide whether they can be reported. Responsible persons 
                                                             
7 See for example: The Press Publicity since the 18th CCP National Congress: Enhancing the Principle of “the 
Party Taking Charge of the Media.” http://news.cntv.cn/2014/02/20/ARTI1392842585460468.shtml 
8 We interviewed one government official in a city-level publicity department, one vice-chief editor in a provincial-
level newspaper, and an experienced journalist in a national-level newspaper. We obtain the information provided 
in this section from these interviews and the information was confirmed by all three anonymous interviewees. 
Importantly, all three interviewees confirm that governments have incentives to closely monitor news related to 
corporate scandals such as tunneling, especially when SOEs are involved.  
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of these authorities and newspapers may be punished if the published news leads to a negative 
impact in the society. Thus, publicity authorities are cautious when censoring news. 
The incentives of censorship include both social and economic dimensions. It is an essential 
objective of the CCP to enhance stability in the society. Thus, the censorship authorities want to 
minimize news that could bring instability and harm the reputation of the government. In addition, 
the CCP may want to protect firms with large numbers of employees because such firms are 
more influential in the local community. To maintain the state’s control over the economy, SOEs 
are an important group that the CCP often prioritizes. The CCP requires that large SOEs 
(including both central- and provincial-level SOEs) should establish modern governance and act 
as “good examples.”9 Also, large firms that are crucial for GDP growth and taxation are an 
important group for the censorship authorities. 
Different censorship authorities likely vary in their incentives. The national-level censorship 
is conducted by the publicity ministry and the key considerations are the national-level social 
and economic incentives. In contrast, the provincial-level publicity departments are more 
concerned about the social and economic objectives of their own provinces and their in-province 
firms. It is worth mentioning that these objectives are often key criteria of the promotion of 
provincial government officials, adding an additional political incentive that is less present at the 
national level. 
Although local newspapers mostly cover their own local companies, they sometimes report 
on major events in companies located in other provinces. When censoring news related to 
companies in other provinces, the provincial-level publicity departments are less affected by the 
                                                             
9  This is stated in the CCP’s The Regulations of Establishing Modern Enterprise Systems and Enhancing 
Governance in State-owned Large- and Medium-Size Enterprises, published in 2000. 
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in-province incentives stated above. Moreover, there is fierce competition in economic 
development and government official promotions among different provinces, leading to even 
weaker incentives to protect out-of-province firms. Therefore, the key consideration of the 
provincial-level authorities concerning out-of-province news is to protect central-level SOEs. 
Importantly, although the provincial-level censorship is conducted by the provincial authorities 
and is normally not affected by the authorities in other provinces, it could be affected by central-
level SOEs as the administrative level of central SOEs (i.e., at the ministry level) is often higher 
than that of the provincial-publicity departments (i.e., at the department level). 
Tunneling by large shareholders and related parties through inter-corporate loans was 
considered a serious issue. Large shareholders extracted cash from listed companies without 
paying back the funds obtained. Jiang et al. (2010) present statistics showing that such loans 
account for 8.1% of the total assets and 15.9% of the shareholders’ equity in listed companies in 
the period of 1996-2004. They report significant consequences of these loans, including large 
losses, financial distress, delisting, and bankruptcy of listed companies. The tunneling problem 
persisted until declared illegal by the Chinese government in 2006.10 In 2006, China’s State 
Council made it clear that inter-corporate-loan tunneling was criminal because it damaged the 
normal functioning of the capital market and discouraged medium and small investors. Because 
of the severe consequences of inter-corporate-loan tunneling, the reputation of the listed firms is 
seriously harmed if their tunneling is covered by the media. Many of the tunneling large 
shareholders are SOEs, which adversely affects the image of the government as a regulator that 
                                                             
10 It is worth noting the fact that the reason government did not intervene until 2006 is not because they could not 
observe the tunneling. In fact, they made efforts to reduce tunneling as early as 2001 (Jiang et al. 2010). The main 
issue is that many state-controlling shareholders were involved, which made the problem so profound that 
government intervention had to be implemented with caution. 
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protects investor rights and creates strong incentives for press control. 
The tunneling setting provides a major advantage for our research design. The involved 
firms all use inter-corporate-loans as the tunneling channel and the same accounting procedure 
to recognize these loans (Jiang et al. 2010). Specifically, these loans are recorded as other 
receivables (OREC) on the balance sheet. Jiang et al. (2010) provide evidence that a firm’s level 
of other receivables captures the extent of its large-shareholder-tunneling. As the account of 
other receivables is easily accessible through firms’ financial reports, it significantly reduces the 
cost of newspaper journalists to identify tunneling firms, making it a plausible assumption that 
journalists are able to identify the tunneling activities by large shareholders.11 
 
2.2 Hypotheses 
Our first research question studies how the censorship authorities give priority to certain 
groups of firms. Our first hypothesis is related to firms that are essential for economic and social 
incentives, including SOEs, firms with large numbers of employees, and large taxpayers. SOEs 
have significant positions in many industries and tunneling through inter-corporate loans is an 
important issue in SOEs. Our descriptive statistics show that among the companies that have the 
most serious tunneling problems, 59% are SOEs. Firms with large numbers of employees and 
large taxpayers are important in the social and economic dimensions and could attract more 
attention from the government. Given the government’s incentives to protect economic growth, 
                                                             
11 During the reading of the tunneling news, we collect a large amount of evidence confirming that newspaper 
journalists are able to identify tunneling activities in both SOEs and non-SOEs through other receivables numbers 
disclosed in the financial statements. For example, in the article titled “SST Guangming’s Occupation of 389 Million 
Fund: Half Uncertain and Half Unclear” and published in China Business News on October 25, 2006, the author 
clearly identifies the loans given to the controlling shareholder and its related parties. 
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social stability, and government reputation, we hypothesize (in the alternative form) that: 
 
H1：Ceteris paribus, firms that are essential for economic and social incentives (SOEs, firms 
with large numbers of employees, and large taxpayers) are less likely to have their tunneling 
news reported in national-level newspapers. 
 
Next, we explore whether the censorship practice is identical across the country or is affected 
by political structures. Section 2.1 discusses the strong economic and political incentives for 
provincial governments to suppress negative news of their in-province companies, either SOEs 
or non-SOEs. We expect stronger censorship of in-province negative news related to both SOEs 
and non-SOEs. 
Regarding local newspapers’ reporting of out-of-province firms, the fierce competition in 
economic development and government official promotions among different provinces reduce 
the incentives of provincial-level governments to implement tighter control of news related to 
firms in other provinces. The exceptions are central-level SOEs that locate in other provinces, as 
they have higher administrative level than provincial publicity departments. In sum, we 
hypothesize (in the alternative form) that: 
 
H2: The censorship practices are affected by government levels and power structures. 
 
Finally, we examine economic consequences of the censorship system and the capital-
market impact of the tunneling news that survives the censorship. To the extent that the tunneling 
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news has incremental information content, we expect negative investor reactions and related 
capital-market consequences such as abnormal trading volumes. However, as the news is subject 
to close censorship, informative news could have been blocked in the process. It is thus possible 
that when it involves sensitive negative information, the news that survives loses its information 
content. Our final hypothesis is (in the alternative form): 
 
H3: Tunneling news that survives after the censorship has information content. 
 
3. Research Design, Data, and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1 Research Design 
Our most important research-design choice is to focus on a sample of tunneling companies 
for our primary analyses. Censorship is difficult to study as the news that is censored is 
unobservable, thus prior research on government information control mainly uses an indirect 
approach to infer censorship. For example, Piotroski et al. (2015) infer information control (not 
censorship per se, but temporarily delaying firm disclosures and media coverage) in the period 
of sensitive political events by documenting a reduction in stock-crash risk in that period. We 
study a direct channel of censorship - through newspapers. To examine whether governments 
suppress negative press of a particular group over another, we need to make the assumption that 
the likelihood of negative coverage for the two groups is otherwise similar without the censorship. 
After a careful examination of our news database, we identify numerous factors that could lead 
to negative coverage, and it is difficult to control for all factors. One way to alleviate the concern 
is to focus on a specific problem that could lead to negative coverage (e.g., tunneling, fraud, etc.). 
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As long as we are able to control for the extent of the specific problem that affects coverage, we 
have reasonable confidence to believe that firms should receive a similar level of coverage on 
that specific issue without the censorship. 
We choose to focus on inter-corporate tunneling as the research setting for several reasons. 
First, the extent to which firms are involved in inter-corporate tunneling is measurable using the 
proxy provided by Jiang et al. (2010). Large shareholders use similar methods to tunnel, making 
it possible to measure it with a standard proxy. It is also not difficult for journalists to discover 
the problem, as evidenced by the numerous tunneling-related news that we collect. Second, as 
stated above, we learn from three in-depth interviews that the publicity authorities are highly 
sensitive to tunneling news. If SOEs are involved, it becomes a crime committed by government 
entities and thus harms government reputation. Third, compared to other problems, such as food-
quality scandals and accounting fraud, the number of firms involved in tunneling is greater, 
making the sample size large enough for the study. 
Following Jiang et al. (2010), we identify the firms with other receivables above the 80th 
percentile as the firms that have tunneling problems.12 Our access to the newspaper database 
starts from 2001, and tunneling through inter-corporate loans is greatly reduced through 
government intervention in 2006 (Jiang et al. 2010). Therefore, we use 2001 to 2006 as the period 
to identify the tunneling firms (514 firms). As we read all the news related to firms, due to 
resource constraints we restrict the tunneling sample to the firms that have other receivables 
above the 80th percentile at least three times during the six years (269 firms). These are the firms 
that have the most serious tunneling problems, and ex ante we expect them to attract more media 
                                                             
12 In untabulated analyses, we find that requiring the level of other receivables to be above the 90th percentile does 
not affect our inferences (but reduces the sample size).  
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attention in absence of censorship.13 For these firms, we read the articles related to them in our 
database from 2001 to 2009 and identify the tunneling-related news. The news coverage sample 
extends to 2009 as we find that newspapers still report some tunneling behaviors (conducted 
before 2006) even after the government intervention in 2006; that is, some tunneling news was 
delayed.14 After 2009, articles related to inter-corporate-loan tunneling became rare, which 
indicates that firms are less likely to use this tunneling method after the government intervention. 
They might shift to other tunneling methods that are less observable. 
We use the following model for our main model to examine the censorship preferences, with 
some variations in different analyses: 
TunnelingNegative_Nationali,t = β0 + β1SOEi,t + β2SIZEi,t-1 + β3BTMi,t + β4ROAi,t-1  
+ β5 LOSSi,t-1 + β6STD_RETi,t-1 + β7ORECi,t-1 + β8LEVERAGEi,t-1  
+ β9NonNegativei,t+ β10Growthi,t-1 +β11AuditOpinioni,t-1       (1) 
+ β12BIG4i,t-1 + β13AGEi,t-1 + β14Promotion i,t 
+ Yeart + Industryi + εi,t 
Where TunnelingNegative_National (TunnelingNegative_inProv/TunnelingNegative_outProv) 
is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of tunneling-related news articles published by 
national (in-province-local / out-of-province-local) newspapers and related to firm i in year t.15 
SOE is an indicator for state-owned enterprises. Importantly, we control for the amount of other 
receivables (OREC) and the number of total non-negative news items related to the firm 
(NonNegative) to take into account the extent of the tunneling problem and the likelihood that 
                                                             
13 Our inferences are unaffected if we restrict our sample to firms that have ranked above the 80th percentile at least 
four times during the six years. 
14 Our inferences remain the same if we use the sample period of 2001-2006. 
15 All our inferences stay unchanged if we replace the new-coverage variables (logarithm of number of news items) 
with indicator variables that equal one if a firm receives coverage of tunneling-related news. 
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the firm is covered by newspapers.  
Additionally, we control for other potential factors that could affect the likelihood of the 
firm receiving tunneling-related news, including total assets (SIZE), book-to-market ratio (BTM), 
profitability (ROA), volatility (STD_RET), leverage (LEVERAGE), growth (Growth), modified 
audit opinions (AuditOpinion), loss (LOSS), Big-4 auditors (BIG4), and number of years since 
IPO (AGE).16 Importantly, we control for provincial promotion events (Promotion) to make sure 
that our results are not driven by special event periods (i.e., a province-year variable). We also 
control for the potentially important impact of the CCP’s National Congress as we include year 
fixed effects in all regressions. Finally, we include industry fixed effects.17 Appendix A provides 
descriptions of the variables. 
Although our primary focus is on tunneling news, we also examine other negative news to 
further understand how the government selects the news topics to be censored.18 We divide the 
non-tunneling negative news into nine types: (1) violation of laws and regulations; (2) corporate 
governance; (3) earnings performance; (4) general corporate conditions; (5) stock-return 
performance; (6) disposal of equity; (7) bankruptcy; (8) restructuring; and (9) setbacks in the 
implementation of the Split-Share-Structure Reform (SSSR). We then examine the presence of 
censorship in each category. 
 
3.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
We obtain accounting data and other company information from China Stock Market 
                                                             
16 BTM, ROA, STD_RET, LEVERAGE, and Growth are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
17 We follow prior China studies in using the 22-industry classification (e.g., Jian and Wong 2010). 
18 As discussed, unlike for tunneling news, we do not have a strong design when it comes to capturing the likelihood 
of other negative news; thus this analysis is primarily descriptive. 
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Accounting Research (CSMAR). We access newspaper articles from China National Knowledge 
Infrastructure (CNKI)’s Database of China’s Major Newspapers.19 The database includes news 
articles published by about 500 newspapers. 
We conduct the news search through the following procedures: First, we identify the target 
tunneling companies, as selected using the procedure described in Section 3.1. Second, we search 
for the full name, the abbreviation, the stock code, and other possible names in both the title and 
the content of the articles included in the database. We use a Java program to extract all the 
selected news items. Third, we identify non-negative and non-related news based on the title; if 
we cannot identify based on the title, we read the entire article. Finally, we read the rest of the 
articles to decide whether they are tunneling-related news, non-tunneling negative news, or non-
negative news.  
For the news related to our tunneling-sample firms, we identify the tunneling-related news. 
Three types of tunneling activities are most prevalent among the sample firms: (1) inter-corporate 
loans, (2) related-party transactions, and (3) loan guarantees provided for related parties. We 
define news reporting on these tunneling behaviors and their consequences as tunneling-related 
negative news. We consider other negative news as non-tunneling negative news. We describe 
the classification in Appendix B using an example. 
The news is further classified into three categories based on the newspapers’ readership and 
circulation. For newspapers that have nation-wide (local) circulation, we consider them as 
national-level (local-level) newspapers. For local newspapers, based on the headquarters of the 
listed firms, we classify them into newspapers located in the same provinces as the firms’ 
                                                             
19 See http://epub.cnki.net/kns/brief/result.aspx?dbprefix=CCND. 
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headquarters (in-province) and those located in other provinces (out-of-province). After 
excluding the non-related news, we obtain 26,806 articles from 439 newspapers in the period of 
2001 to 2009 for our 269 tunneling firms. 
Table 1 presents the sample-selection process and its distribution by year and industry. In 
total, we have 2,100 firm-year observations. The number of observations is well distributed over 
our sample period. We observe a concentration of firms in the manufacturing industry (52.83%), 
followed by information technology (9.06%) and distribution and retail (6.73%). Panel A of 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the sample. As the sample firms have severe problems 
of inter-corporate-loan tunneling, on average they have negative ROA (-0.020), high other 
receivables as a percentage of total assets (0.173), high leverage ratio (0.633), and high book-to-
market ratio (0.890). Panel A also shows the mean number of news articles reported in each 
category. In Panel B, we provide the statistics of tunneling-news coverage at the firm level. We 
show that the mean (median) firm is reported 7 (5) times regarding their tunneling issue and 17 
(11) times on other negative news during the sample period. Panel C of Table 2 presents the 
distribution of the tunneling, other negative, and non-negative news among the three levels (i.e., 
national, in-province, and out-of-province). 
In Figure 1, we show the changes in press coverage of tunneling news over the sample period. 
The number of tunneling articles increases by 50% per year from 2001 to 2003. It also increases 
steadily in the period of 2003 to 2006 when it peaks. Tunneling news drops significantly after 
2006, and reaches the 2001-level in 2009. Jiang et al. (2010) describe three phases of regulatory 
reform to curb inter-corporate tunneling and classify 2001-2003 as the “Opening Round,” 2004-
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2005 as the “Middle Game,” and 2006 as the “End Game.”20 The changes in the number of 
tunneling news articles as shown in Figure 1 perfectly matches the timeline as the new rules 
came out, suggesting that the media cares about the tunneling issues and increases the coverage 
as the new rules put more pressures on the tunneling shareholders. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Censorship of Tunneling News Related to Firm Characteristics 
We start our analyses by testing the censorship of tunneling news related to firms that are 
essential for social and economic incentives. First, we examine the potential protection for SOEs. 
In Column 1 of Table 3, we find that, for national-level newspapers, tunneling SOEs are 
significantly less likely to have tunneling-related news coverage than tunneling non-SOEs 
(significant at the one-percent level using a two-sided test), after controlling for the extent of 
tunneling and other factors that may affect coverage.21 In Column 2, we separate the SOEs into 
central- and provincial-level SOEs, and find that both types of SOEs receive significantly greater 
protection than non-SOEs for tunneling news. Column 3 indicates that tunneling SOEs are also 
less likely to get coverage of other negative news. Importantly, Column 4 serves as a placebo 
test and shows that tunneling SOEs do not differ from tunneling non-SOEs in the likelihood of 
receiving non-negative news, suggesting that our results are not driven by firm characteristics 
                                                             
20 The “Opening Round” is when the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) started to issue requests 
(in 2001) and explicit instructions to listed companies to stop the practice of lending to controlling shareholders. 
The “Middle Game” is when the State Council issued directives to support the CSRC and the CSRC spelled out 
explicit non-compliance penalties The “End Game” is when eight government ministries announced inter-corporate-
loan tunneling to be criminal and the government started to arrest top managers of the controlling shareholders who 
failed to resolve the issue. 
21 The coefficient on SOE transforms to -0.37 if the dependent variable is the raw number instead of the natural 
logarithm, indicating that the tunneling news related to SOEs is 0.37 items fewer than that related to non-SOEs. 
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that affect general news coverage.  
In Columns 5-6, we partition our sample into large versus small firms based of the median 
of SIZE. The coefficient on SOE is significant at the one-percent level for the large companies, 
while insignificant for the smaller ones. The difference between the two coefficients is 
statistically significant at the one-percent level. The results indicate that the protection of SOEs 
concentrates on large SOEs, consistent with the expectation that governments do not want 
negative news of large SOEs to be disseminated.  
Next, we examine the protection of firms with large numbers of employees given these firms’ 
important social function. We first divide the sample firms into terciles based on the number of 
employees, in which the bottom-tercile firms have the lowest numbers. We then use propensity-
score matching (PSM) to identify comparable pairs in the two groups. In particular, the matched 
pairs are required to be similar in terms of SOE, SIZE, BTM, LEVERAGE, and OREC. We require 
a strict caliper distance of 0.001 and implement PSM without replacement. Panel A of Table 4 
demonstrates that all significant differences in the matching dimensions are removed by the PSM 
procedure. 
In the PSM sample, we predict and find (Panel B of Table 4) that less censorship is 
implemented for both tunneling and other negative press related to firms with fewer employees, 
although these firms are not different from others in other dimensions, including firm size. Again, 
no difference is found for non-negative news. These results provide additional confidence for 
the interpretation of the previous findings, and highlight the importance of the incentive to 
protect employment. 
We implement a similar matching process for the test of large taxpayers. We divide the 
21 
 
sample firms into terciles based on the total income taxes paid, in which the top-tercile firms 
have the highest total taxes paid. To meaningfully compare the large and small taxpayers, the 
most important matching dimensions are firm size (SIZE) and profitability (ROA). In addition, 
we add SOE, BTM, LEVERAGE, and OREC to our PSM procedure. Panel A of Table 5 shows 
that the PSM process erases all significant differences in the matching dimensions. In Panel B of 
Table 5, we find that large taxpayers are exposed to significantly lower coverage of tunneling 
news, but do not differ from small taxpayers in terms of non-negative news. Overall, the first set 
of results provide evidence of censorship of tunneling news related to firms that are essential for 
economic and social incentives, thus supporting H1. 
 
4.2 Censors’ Incentives at the Local Level: In-Province versus Out-of-Province 
Table 6 shows the results of the investigation of the local censorship of SOE-related news: 
in-province versus out-of-province. As discussed in Section 2, provincial publicity authorities 
have different incentives in the censorship of firms headquartered in the same versus in other 
provinces. In particular, provincial governments have strong economic and political incentives 
to protect their in-province firms, but these incentives of local protectionism are not present when 
reviewing stories related to firms in other provinces.  
In Columns 1-3 of Table 6, we observe that for out-of-province news, only the central SOEs 
receive significantly less coverage of tunneling and other negative news, whereas the coefficients 
on SOE_Provincial are insignificant. These results are in line with our previous discussion that 
provincial-level governments are still concerned about central SOEs located in other provinces 
because central SOEs tend to have higher administrative level than provincial publicity 
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departments. Thus, provincial governments control negative news related to central SOEs. In 
contrast, they give little protection to provincial-level SOEs located in other provinces given the 
lack of economic incentives and the concern for cross-provincial competition.  
Interestingly, the coefficients associated with SOEs are insignificant in the tests of in-
province news (Columns 4-6). A plausible explanation is local protectionism. Public companies, 
both SOEs and non-SOEs, are scarce resources for the provincial governments. They are 
typically the largest firms in the provinces and have a significant impact on the local economy 
and employment. The results suggest that the provincial governments’ protection does not differ 
between in-province SOEs and non-SOEs. 
Further scrutiny indicates that the provincial publicity authorities in fact suppress most of 
the negative news related to in-province tunneling firms. As shown in Figure 2, while tunneling 
news comprises 7.4% of the total amount of the national-level news and 7.6% of the out-of-
province local news, it accounts for only 1.4% of the in-province local news. Similarly, although 
other negative news represents 17.6% of the total amount of national-level news and 20.3% of 
the out-of-province local news, it comprises only 5.1% of the in-province local news. 
Interestingly, it is not because these local newspapers do not have the tradition or ability to report 
negative news. When reporting on firms in other provinces, the proportion of tunneling and 
negative news is even greater than that of the national-level newspapers (7.6% versus 7.4% for 
tunneling news, and 20.3% versus 17.6% for other negative news). 
In addition, Figure 3 shows that provincial governments delay the dissemination of tunneling 
news, potentially in an attempt to reduce the timeliness of such stories. Year 0 represents the year 
that the firms’ other receivables is at the highest level over the sample period, and Year1– Year3 
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(Year -3 – Year -1) represent the three years following (prior to) Year 0. We find that for national-
level news and out-of-province local news, the amount of tunneling news peaks around Year 0. 
This is consistent with the expectation that most news should come at the time when the problem 
is the most serious. In contrast, for in-province local news, the amount of tunneling news peaks 
in Year 1 and Year 3, showing a significant delay. The t-statistics below Figure 3 support the 
notion that tunneling news from national and out-of-province-local newspapers concentrate on 
Year -1 and Year 0. The amount of news in these two years is significantly greater than other 
years, while the same pattern is not present for in-province-local tunneling news. 
 
4.3 Economic Consequences of the Censorship 
The above sections investigate how the censorship is conducted. In this section, we study 
the economic consequences of the censorship. In particular, we raise the following questions. 
First, do the protected firms benefit from the censorship? Second, does the news that survives 
after the censorship have any information content?  
We begin by investigating whether the tunneling news leads to negative capital-market 
effects, and thus whether the protected firms benefit from avoiding these negative impacts. We 
first examine whether the publication of tunneling news leads to abnormal returns. For each item 
of all our tunneling news, including both national and local news, we calculate abnormal returns 
using the market-adjusted model for the date of publication (i.e., the event date), and the ten 
trading days before and after the event.22,23 We also calculate abnormal trading volumes and 
                                                             
22 In the cases where the date of publication is not a trading day, we use the next available trading day as the event 
date while requiring that the date of publication is less than three calendar days ahead of the next available trading 
day. We implement this requirement as it is unrealistic to expect investor reactions to the information in old 
newspapers. 
23 We also conduct our analyses using the market model and the inferences are not affected. We present the market-
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abnormal market depths following Bushee et al. (2010), using the medians of the daily volume 
and depth in the (-40, -11) window to represent the firms’ normal values.24  
We present the abnormal returns, trading volumes, and market depths for each day in the (-
10, +10) window in Panels A-B of Table 7. In Panels A-C of Figure 4, we present the medians 
of the daily abnormal returns, trading volumes, and depths in the (-10, +10) window. Altogether, 
we have 1,362 event dates that have non-missing observations. 
We find negative and significant abnormal returns on day 0 (i.e., AR0 = -0.0057), indicating 
that the reported companies underperform on the event date.25 We also find negative abnormal 
returns for some of the other trading days in the window, indicating that these tunneling 
companies on average experience negative returns around the reporting period. This makes sense 
as the newspaper coverage could be driven by recent tunneling problems and poor stock 
performance. Most importantly, we find that the abnormal returns on the event date is the largest 
among all trading days in the window. We also find in t-tests that the abnormal return on the 
event date is significantly more negative than on any other day in the window. 
We further find that Day 0 has the highest abnormal trading volumes and highest market 
depths in the window. The abnormal trading volume on Day 0 is significantly greater than 13 of 
the other 20 days. The abnormal market depth on Day 0 is significantly greater than all the other 
days in the window. Overall, the results suggest that the tunneling news leads to negative market 
reactions and more frequent trading. The abnormal market depths further suggest that the news 
                                                             
adjusted model as it preserves more observations. 
24 Daily depth is the daily average of each quote’s depth, calculated as the sum of the dollar offer size and the dollar 
bid size. 
25 In our event study, we primarily use AR0 as the event window because we expect newspapers are most likely to 
have an effect on the date of publication given the characteristics of this media. However, negative and significant 
returns are also found if we use cumulative abnormal returns in other windows such as (-1, 0), (0, +1), and (0, +2). 
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has information content.26,27 
Our primary explanation for capital-market effects on the event date is the effect of news 
dissemination by newspapers (i.e., the dissemination effect). An alternative explanation is that it 
is the tunneling issues covered by the news that are driving the abnormal returns, volumes, and 
depths (i.e., the tunneling effect). We consider both explanations plausible and meaningful. The 
first explanation is consistent with the role of the press as an information intermediary, and 
suggests that the media still fulfills this role (at least to some extent) even subjected to strict 
censorship. The second explanation indicates that the newspapers’ reporting is timely in spite of 
the censorship as it quickly captures the tunneling behavior. 
Taking into account newspapers’ publication practices, we consider the dissemination effect 
relatively more likely. Normally newspapers are printed in the previous evening (morning 
newspapers) or the same-day morning (evening newspapers). If a firm disclosure indicates a 
tunneling issue, it will most likely be reported by newspapers the next day. We observe the 
strongest capital-market effect on the day of publication, consistent with the dissemination effect. 
If the capital-market effect is driven by the reported tunneling issues, we would have observed 
                                                             
26 Importantly, Jiang et al. (2010) find that the market discounts the tunneling firms but does not fully price the 
negative implications despite the fact that the extent of tunneling should be easily observable. They surmise that the 
lack of complete pricing effect could be due to the prevalence of individual investors in China. We show that the 
market reacts to media coverage of tunneling news, which is consistent with the results in Jiang et al. (2010). While 
individual investors may have difficulty in understanding the numbers in financial reports, they should be in a 
position to realize the negative outcomes of tunneling when covered by newspapers. 
27 Why does the market react to the news stories given the fact that tunneling is already disclosed through financial 
reports? A reasonable explanation is that the Chinese capital market, especially in our sample period of 2001-2009, 
is highly dominated by unsophisticated individual investors. It is plausible that broader dissemination of tunneling 
news could attract attention of individual investors and lead to abnormal trading volumes and returns. Even in a 
more efficient market such as the U.S. market, Bushee, Core, Guay, and Hamm (2010) show that dissemination of 
news (instead of creation of information) by the business press leads abnormal market reactions. 
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the strongest effect at least one day ahead of the event date (the date of newspaper publication) 
To further disentangle the two explanations, we examine the frequency of firm disclosures 
coinciding with the event dates. If there are no disclosures on the event dates, it is less likely that 
the capital-market effects are driven by sources other than newspaper dissemination. We collect 
the dates with firm disclosures from the WIND database. After that, we redo the analyses in this 
section focusing on the dates without firm disclosures. Among the 1,362 event dates, only 271 
of them are dates with firm disclosures, and 1,091 of them are without any firm disclosures. We 
find that all the inferences remain the same after excluding the dates that coincide with firm 
disclosures. Panels A-C of Figure 5 present the medians of daily abnormal returns, trading 
volumes, and market depths. This provides further evidence suggesting that the documented 
capital-market effects are a result of newspaper dissemination. 
In addition to the above-mentioned alternative explanation (i.e., the tunneling effect), 
another interpretation of our results is a signaling effect, that is, the tunneling news may make 
investors believe that the firm has less government support than previously expected, and thus 
react negatively. To rule out this possibility, we remove the event dates for the first time that 
tunneling is covered for a firm and only examine any subsequent coverage of tunneling. 
Insofar as the “signaling interpretation” holds, the market reactions to the first time that 
tunneling is covered should be significantly more negative than on any subsequent coverage. To 
the extent that tunneling already has been covered before, investors might already think that the 
firm has little government protection. Hence, any subsequent disclosures of tunneling might not 
have a strong impact on returns – the “signaling channel” is weak. To the extent that the 
dissemination mechanism works, negative abnormal returns should be similar regardless of 
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whether any tunneling has been disclosed before. Untabulated results show that all our inferences 
hold when we remove the event dates for the first time that a firm is covered regarding a tunneling 
issue, thus suggesting that the market reactions are unlikely to be due to the signaling of lack of 
government protection. 
 
5. Supplementary Analyses 
5.1 Censorship of Other Negative News 
The above results provide evidence related to censorship of tunneling news. Although our 
research design is tailored to identify censorship of tunneling news, we conduct a further study 
of the censorship of negative news to obtain a better understanding of how the censorship is 
implemented.28 In Table 8, we examine the censorship of nine categories of other negative news 
at the national level. We find that the SOEs receive significantly less coverage of three news 
categories: violations of laws and regulations, general corporate conditions, and large 
shareholders’ disposals of equity. We do not find any evidence of censorship of negative news 
related to stock-return performance, bankruptcy, restructuring, and setbacks in SSSR 
implementation. These results are based on an implicit assumption that these firms would have 
otherwise similar level of other types of negative news without censorship. Given the difficulty 
in controlling for the extent of the problems that lead to the negative news (unlike our tests of 
tunneling news), we consider this analysis primarily descriptive.  
The results echo the government’s strong focus on firm reputation and future prospects. 
                                                             
28 Compared to the tests of tunneling news, the disadvantage of this test is we cannot accurately measure the extent 
of the “problems” (the topic subject to censorship). Thus, we focus primarily on the tunneling tests because of a 




News related to law violations harms firms’ reputations. News reporting on general corporate 
conditions and disposals of equity bring negative concerns toward future performance.  
The findings also indicate some areas that the government does not give its attention to. 
Consistent with the insight provided by our three anonymous interviewees, the government does 
not appear to censor news related to daily stock returns, possibly because such information could 
easily be accessed through other channels. We also do not find evidence of censorship of news 
describing financially struggling firms (e.g., bankruptcy and restructuring). A likely explanation 
is that the difficulties of these firms are well known so there is no need to conceal information. 
 
5.2 The Incentives of Newspapers  
In this section, we provide a brief examination of the incentives for the newspapers that are 
monitored. A central question is: To the extent that tunneling news is subject to strict censorship, 
do the newspapers still have sufficient incentives to report tunneling issues? 
To explore variations in newspapers’ incentives, we divide the newspapers into two groups: 
official versus commercial newspapers. The CCP has a list of official newspapers that are highly 
acknowledged by the party. As the party’s mouthpieces, these newspapers are considered more 
authoritative. For example, news published in official newspapers can be reprinted in other 
newspapers or online news providers without additional censorship. Official newspapers have 
guaranteed subscriptions from different levels of governments and SOEs and receive funding 
from the state. 
In contrast, commercial newspapers receive limited financial support from the state and rely 
heavily on advertising and circulation as the major revenue sources, which increases their 
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incentives to follow readers’ interest and report on negative news. However, reporting of 
negative news is subject to censorship and newspapers editors are held responsible if the reported 
news leads to negative social impacts unwelcomed by the CCP. Thus, commercial newspapers 
face a trade-off between attracting readers and following the rules of the game. 
In Panel A of Table 9, we find that both the official and commercial newspapers are subject 
to censorship. In both types of newspapers, tunneling SOEs (including central- and provincial-
level) receive significantly lower tunneling and other negative press coverage (Columns 1-2). 
Also, in the PSM samples (as described in Section 4.3) for firms with large numbers of 
employees and large taxpayers, the ones with more employees and paying more tax are 
significantly less likely to be covered by tunneling and other negative news than their 
counterparts (Columns 3-6). 
We next investigate the newspapers’ incentives to follow tunneling news. In Column 1 of 
Panel B, we find that the newspapers are significantly more likely to report tunneling news of 
companies that have experienced negative abnormal returns during the year (Annual_ABN_RET). 
The annual abnormal returns are defined as raw returns minus the mean returns of China’s listed 
firms in the same size and book-to-market decile. This provides evidence that the newspapers 
attempt to follow these more problematic companies (i.e., those with lower returns) in spite of 
the strict censorship. We confirm this finding for both commercial (Column 2) and official 
newspapers (Column 4) when they report the tunneling scandals of non-SOEs. We find that the 
coefficient on Annual_ABN_RET is larger in magnitude for commercial newspapers compared 
to official newspapers, but the difference is not statistically significant. 
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However, when reporting tunneling scandals relate to SOEs, the commercial newspapers do 
not increase the reporting of the more problematic companies with lower returns (Column 3) 
(i.e., the coefficient on Annual_ABN_RET is insignificant). The coefficient on 
Annual_ABN_RET in Column 2 is also significantly more negative than that in Column 3 at the 
one-percent level. Although the official newspapers are still significantly more likely to follow 
the tunneling SOEs with lower returns, the magnitude is significantly smaller than that for non-
SOEs (i.e., the coefficient on Annual_ABN_RET in Column 5 is significantly less negative than 
that in Column 4 at the ten-percent level).  
To summarize, negative returns of non-SOEs stimulate more reporting of tunneling news 
for both commercial and official newspapers, with the magnitude larger in the commercial ones. 
These results are consistent with commercial newspapers having stronger incentives to report on 
problematic companies. In contrast, negative returns of SOEs do not trigger more reporting of 
tunneling news for commercial newspapers. This finding indicates that, despite the readers’ 
interest, commercial newspapers cannot (or dare not) touch the protected companies due to the 
presence of censorship. In comparison, negative returns of SOEs lead to more reporting by 
official newspapers, suggesting that, as the CCP’s mouthpieces, official newspapers are granted 
more permission to report the tunneling news of protected companies such as SOEs. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper studies how the Chinese government conducts press control over news related to 
tunneling of listed firms. Our results indicate that the government implements stricter control 
over tunneling news related to SOEs (especially large SOEs), firms that employ more people, 
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and large taxpayers. We do not find such difference in non-negative news among different groups, 
consistent with the censorship explanation. 
The provincial-level publicity departments, driven by local economic and social incentives, 
implement different censorship policies toward news related to firms located in their own versus 
other provinces. Tunneling news related to firms located in the same provinces is mostly 
suppressed and delayed, while only moderate control is implemented related to firms in other 
provinces. Central-level SOEs are the major concern of provincial governments when the news 
involves firms in other provinces, which is likely explained by the relative positions of provincial 
governments and central-level SOEs in China’s power system. 
Analyses of the economic consequences of the censorship reveal that the censorship has 
potentially blocked some news with information content. Our results show that the news that 
survives the censorship has information content. Specifically, the market reacts negatively to the 
dissemination of the tunneling news. The dissemination of the news also increases trading 
volumes and market depths, implying that it has real effects on investors’ trading behaviors and 
firms’ information environment. The protected companies thus benefit from the censorship as 
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Natural logarithm of one plus the number of tunneling-related 
negative news in local-level newspapers located in the same 
province with firm i in a given year. 
TunnelingNegative 
_outProv 
Natural logarithm of one plus the number of tunneling-related 
negative news in local-level newspapers located in a different 
province compared to firm i in a given year. 
TunnelingNegative 
_Commercial 
Natural logarithm of one plus the number of tunneling-related 
negative news in commercial newspapers for firm i in a given year. 
TunnelingNegative 
_Official 
Natural logarithm of one plus the number of tunneling-related 
negative news in official newspapers for firm i in a given year. 
OtherNegative_National Natural logarithm of one plus the number of other negative news 
in the national-level newspapers for firm i in a given year. 
OtherNegative_inProv Natural logarithm of one plus the number of other negative news 
in local-level newspapers located in the same province with firm i 
in a given year. 
OtherNegative_outProv Natural logarithm of one plus the number of other negative news 
in local-level newspapers located in a different province compared 
to firm i in a given year. 
NonNegative Natural logarithm of one plus the number of non-negative news 
related to firm i in a given year. 
NonNegative_National Natural logarithm of one plus the number of non-negative news in 
the national-level newspapers for firm i in a given year. 
NonNegative_inProv Natural logarithm of one plus the number of non-negative news in 
local-level newspapers located in the same province with firm i in 
a given year. 
NonNegative_outProv Natural logarithm of one plus the number of non-negative news in 
local-level newspapers located in a different province compared 
to firm i in a given year. 
Violation_National Natural logarithm of one plus the number of negative news related 
to violations of laws and regulations in the national-level 
newspapers for firm i in a given year. 
Governance_National Natural logarithm of one plus the number of negative news related 
to governance issues in the national-level newspapers for firm i in 
a given year. 
Earnings_National Natural logarithm of one plus the number of negative news related 
to earnings performance in the national-level newspapers for firm 
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i in a given year. 
General_National Natural logarithm of one plus the number of negative news related 
to general firm conditions in the national-level newspapers for 
firm i in a given year. 
Return_National Natural logarithm of one plus the number of negative news related 
to stock return performance in the national-level newspapers for 
firm i in a given year. 
Equity_National Natural logarithm of one plus the number of negative news related 
to disposals of equity by large shareholders in the national-level 
newspapers for firm i in a given year. 
Bankruptcy_National Natural logarithm of one plus the number of negative news related 
to bankruptcy and financial distress in the national-level 
newspapers for firm i in a given year. 
Restructuring_National Natural logarithm of one plus the number of negative news related 
to restructuring of distress firms in the national-level newspapers 
for firm i in a given year. 
SSSR_National Natural logarithm of one plus the number of negative news related 
to setbacks in the implementation of SSSR in the national-level 
newspapers for firm i in a given year. 
SOE Indicator variable that equals one if a firm’s controlling 
shareholder is a government entity, and zero otherwise. 
SOE_Central Indicator variable that equals one if a firm’s controlling 
shareholder is a central-government entity, and zero otherwise.  
SOE_Provincial Indicator variable that equals one if a firm’s controlling 
shareholder is a provincial- or lower-level government entity, and 
zero otherwise. 
SIZE Lagged natural logarithm of total assets. 
BTM Book value of total assets divided by market capitalization.  
ROA Lagged return on total assets. 
LOSS Indicator variable that equals one if the firm reports a loss in the 
previous year, and zero otherwise. 
STD_RET 
Lagged standard deviation of the residuals from the market model. 
OREC Lagged other receivables as a percentage of total assets. 
LEVERAGE Lagged financial leverage measured as total liabilities divided by 
total assets. 
Growth Lagged sales growth. 
AuditOpinion Indicator variable that equals one if the firm receives an unclean 
audit opinion in the previous year, and zero otherwise. 
BIG4 Indicator variable that equals one if the firm hires a Big-4 auditor 
in the previous year, and zero otherwise. 
AGE Number of years since IPO = natural logarithm of one plus the 
number of years since being listed in the previous year. 
Promotion Indicator variable that equals one if the year precedes or 
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corresponds to a provincial-level political promotion event, and 
zero otherwise (i.e., a province-year variable). 
NumEmployees Number of the employees in firm i in a given year. 
Small_Employer Indicator variable that equals one if the number of employees of 
the firm belongs to the bottom tercile of the sample, and zero 
otherwise. 
Large_Taxpayers Indicator variable that equals one if the firms’ total income taxes 
paid belongs to the top tercile of the sample, and zero otherwise. 
ABN_RET Abnormal return of the (-10, +10) window. The difference 
between a firm’s return and the equal-weighted market return in 
the (-10, +10) window. 
ABN_VOL Natural logarithm of volume in the (-10, +10) window minus 
natural logarithm of median volume in the (-40, -11) window. 
ABN_DEPTH Natural logarithm of depth in the (-10, +10) window minus natural 
logarithm of median depth in the (-40, -11) window, where depth 
is the period average of daily depths, where the daily depth is the 
daily average of each quote’s depth. Each quote’s depth is 
calculated as (offer size×offer price + bid size × bid price).  
Annual_ABN_RET Raw annual returns minus the equal-weighted return of a portfolio 




Classification of Tunneling-Related Negative News 
 
We classify the news related to our sample companies into tunneling-related, other 
negative news, and non-negative news. In this section, we describe the classification process. 
For each company included in our tunneling-company sample (the firms that have 
ranked above the 80th percentile at least three times during the six years (269 firms)), we search 
in the CNKI database of China’s major newspapers using the stock code and company name. 
We then extract all the selected news articles through a Java program.  
The initially-selected news contains non-related news, tunneling-related negative news, 
other negative news, and non-negative news. Some of the non-negative and non-related news 
can be identified through their titles. Thus, we first read the titles of all the news and classify a 
group of non-negative and non-related news based on their titles. We then read the rest of the 
articles and classify them based on the content of the articles.  
Three types of tunneling activities are most prevalent among the sample firms: (1) inter-
corporate loans, (2) related-party transactions, and (3) loan guarantees provided for related 
parties. We define news reporting on these tunneling behaviors and their consequences as 
tunneling-related negative news. Below we provide examples for the classification of tunneling 
news. 
On January 28, 2003, Securities Daily published an article titled Macat Group’s 
Controlling Shareholders Occupying Capitals. On March 23, 2004, China Securities Journal 
had a story titled ST Macat’s Large Shareholders Only Admitted Part of Their Capital-
Occupying Behaviors. Both articles report that the large shareholders of Macat Group (stock 
code: 000150) occupied funds of listed companies through inter-corporate loans. Thus, they 
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are classified as tunneling-related news. 
On January 15, 2009, China Economic Times published an article titled Delayed 
Disclosure of Related-Party Transaction: Shanghai Met CO., Ltd condemned by CSRC. On 
November 28, 2007, Shanghai Securities News had news titled Asset Black Hole of Shanghai 
Met CO., Ltd. We read the two articles and they both reported that controlling shareholders 
tunneled Shanghai Met CO., Ltd (stock code: 600645) through related-party transactions. They 
are thus classified as tunneling-related news. 
On August 6, 2004 and May 29, 2007, China Securities Journal reported Shenzhen 
Capstone Industrial Co., Ltd Provided Loan Guarantees of More Than 200 Million and S*ST 
Shenzhen Capstone Industrial Co., Ltd Sued for Illegal Loan Guarantees. Both articles 
suggested that the large shareholders of Shenzhen Capstone Industrial Co., Ltd (stock code: 









                                                             
29 The “Opening Round,” “Middle Game,” and “End Game” are three phases defined by Jiang et al. 
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Figure 3: Year Distribution of Tunneling News 
Panel A: National Level 
 
 
Panel B: Out-of-Province Local 
 
































































































Figure 4: Abnormal Returns, Volumes, and Market Depths in the (-10, +10) 
Window 
 
Panel A: Median Abnormal Returns in the (-10, +10) Window 
 
Panel B: Median Abnormal Volumes in the (-10, +10) Window 
 



























































Figure 5: Abnormal Returns, Volumes, and Market Depths in the (-10, +10) 
Window (Removing the Dates with Firm Disclosures) 
 
Panel A: Median Abnormal Returns in the (-10, +10) Window 
 
Panel B: Median Abnormal Volumes in the (-10, +10) Window 
 



























































Table 1: Sample Selection and Distribution 
Panel A: Sample Selection 
  # Obs. 
Number of A-share firm-year observations during 2001–2009 in 
CSMAR 
 12,798 
     Less: Firms that have never ranked above the 80th percentile 
of the other receivables level 
(8,445)  
     Less: Firms that have ranked above the 80th percentile of the 
other receivables level only once or twice during 2001-2006 
(2,036)  
Final sample  2,317 
     Less: Observations that have missing values in the main tests   217 
Sample size in the main tests  2,100 
 
Panel B: Year Distribution of the Sample 
Year # Obs. Percent 
2001 263 11.35% 
2002 268 11.57% 
2003 269 11.61% 
2004 264 11.39% 
2005 254 10.96% 
2006 253 10.92% 
2007 249 10.75% 
2008 249 10.75% 
2009 248 10.70% 
Total 2,317 100.00% 
 
Panel C: Industry Distribution of the Sample 
Industry # Obs. Percent 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 78 3.37% 
Mining 9 0.39% 
Manufacturing 1,224 52.83% 
Utilities 44 1.90% 
Construction 52 2.24% 
Transportation and warehousing 76 3.28% 
Information technology 210 9.06% 
Distribution and retail 156 6.73% 
Financial 9 0.39% 
Real estate 90 3.88% 
Service 63 2.72% 
Communication and mass media 31 1.34% 
Other Industries 275 11.87% 
Total 2,317 100.00% 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Main Variables 
Variables # Obs. Mean Median Std 25th  75th 
TunnelingNegative_National 2,317 0.309 0.000 0.553 0.000 0.693 
TunnelingNegative _inProv 2,317 0.007 0.000 0.073 0.000 0.000 
TunnelingNegative _outProv 2,317 0.063 0.000 0.239 0.000 0.000 
TunnelingNegative _ Commercial 2,317 0.218 0.000 0.458 0.000 0.000 
TunnelingNegative _ Official 2,317 0.187 0.000 0.417 0.000 0.000 
OtherNegative_National 2,317 0.573 0.000 0.754 0.000 1.099 
OtherNegative_inProv 2,317 0.023 0.000 0.148 0.000 0.000 
OtherNegative_outProv 2,317 0.143 0.000 0.379 0.000 0.000 
NonNegative 2,317 1.593 1.609 1.046 0.693 2.303 
NonNegative_National 2,317 1.432 1.386 1.000 0.693 2.079 
NonNegative_inProv 2,317 0.211 0.000 0.558 0.000 0.000 
NonNegative_outProv 2,317 0.427 0.000 0.643 0.000 0.693 
SOE 2,305 0.586 1.000 0.493 0.000 1.000 
SIZE 2,303 20.605 20.666 1.025 20.108 21.183 
BTM 2,270 0.890 0.693 0.734 0.390 1.178 
ROA 2,303 -0.020 0.012 0.107 -0.036 0.034 
LOSS 2,306 0.292 0.000 0.455 0.000 1.000 
STD_RET 2,142 0.047 0.043 0.020 0.032 0.059 
OREC 2,301 0.173 0.137 0.133 0.068 0.245 
LEVERAGE 2,303 0.633 0.587 0.317 0.432 0.749 
Growth 2,248 0.199 0.064 0.811 -0.165 0.304 
AuditOpinion 2,303 0.288 0.000 0.453 0.000 1.000 
BIG4 2,303 0.017 0.000 0.131 0.000 0.000 
AGE 2,302 2.080 2.197 0.513 1.792 2.398 
Promotion 2,317 0.597 1.000 0.491 0.000 1.000 





Panel B: Firm-Level Descriptive Statistics of News Coverage 
 # Obs. Mean Median Std 25th  75th 
TunnelingNegative 269 6.959 5.000 7.847 2.000 9.000 
OtherNegative 269 17.004 11.000 24.556 5.000 21.000 
NonNegative 269 75.695 39.000 201.075 24.000 68.000 
 
Panel C: Distribution of Newspaper Articles 
  National In-Province Local Out-of-Province Local Total 
TunnelingNegative 1,593 25 254 1,872 
OtherNegative 3,799 94 681 4,574 
NonNegative 16,215 1,725 2,420 20,360 
Total 21,607 1,844 3,355 26,806 
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Table 3: Censorship of SOE-Related News at the National Level 

























SOE -0.105***  -0.085** -0.010 -0.204*** -0.029 
 (-3.491)  (-2.056) (-0.150) (-4.378) (-0.816) 
SOE_  -0.125***     
Central  (-2.956)     
SOE_  -0.092***     
Provincial  (-2.955)     
SIZE 0.042** 0.041** -0.025 0.363*** 0.106** 0.086*** 
 (2.028) (1.982) (-0.921) (6.269) (2.044) (2.651) 
BTM 0.091** 0.091** 0.041 -0.142** 0.107*** 0.036 
 (2.509) (2.494) (1.052) (-2.455) (2.633) (0.572) 
ROA -0.783*** -0.773*** -1.285*** 0.557 -0.668* -0.967*** 
 (-3.499) (-3.446) (-4.465) (1.338) (-1.798) (-3.468) 
LOSS 0.050 0.051 0.196*** 0.062 0.119* -0.015 
 (1.230) (1.254) (3.761) (0.860) (1.954) (-0.272) 
STD_RET 0.555 0.566 3.225*** 2.973 1.580 -0.937 
 (0.620) (0.629) (2.793) (1.515) (1.318) (-0.703) 
OREC 0.576*** 0.582*** 0.051 0.178 0.668** 0.533*** 
 (3.929) (3.976) (0.296) (0.559) (2.574) (3.433) 
LEVERAGE -0.090* -0.091* -0.003 0.295** -0.097 -0.052 
 (-1.713) (-1.712) (-0.030) (2.124) (-0.978) (-0.803) 
NonNegative 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.241***  0.071*** 0.096*** 
 (5.173) (5.136) (10.066)  (2.704) (4.856) 
Growth 0.027* 0.027* -0.004 0.028 0.039 0.026 
 (1.829) (1.814) (-0.242) (1.054) (1.499) (1.447) 
AuditOpinion 0.187*** 0.187*** 0.249*** 0.110 0.149** 0.187*** 
 (4.747) (4.703) (4.694) (1.446) (2.426) (3.918) 
BIG4 -0.103 -0.106 -0.157 0.133 -0.080 -0.264* 
 (-1.201) (-1.230) (-0.986) (0.570) (-0.761) (-1.782) 
AGE -0.039 -0.040 -0.065 -0.262** -0.106 -0.024 
 (-1.065) (-1.111) (-1.123) (-2.406) (-1.549) (-0.571) 
Promotion -0.039 0.002 -0.065 -0.262** -0.106 -0.024 
 (-1.065) (0.076) (-1.123) (-2.406) (-1.549) (-0.571) 
Year F.E Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry F.E Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant 0.003 -0.870** 0.029 -0.011 -0.042 0.056* 
 (0.113) (-1.982) (0.894) (-0.267) (-1.043) (1.702) 
# Obs. 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 1,050 1,050 
Adj. R2 0.174 0.174 0.275 0.210 0.192 0.172 
Size above Median Vs. Size below Median Diff Z-Value 
Test of Coefficient Difference (SOE) -0.175*** -2.963 
See Appendix A for variable definitions. Standard errors are clustered by firm. ***, **,* denote 




Table 4: Censorship of News related to Firms with Large Numbers of Employees  
Panel A: Firm Characteristics with and without PSM 
 
Pre-PSM Post-PSM 







































Panel B: Regressions using the PSM Sample 
 







Small_Employer 0.122*** 0.137*** 0.018 
 (3.239) (2.881) (0.210) 
Control Variables Included Included Included 
Year F.E Included Included Included 
Industry F.E Included Included Included 
Constant -2.166*** -1.095 -4.108** 
 (-2.725) (-1.328) (-2.214) 
# Obs. 875 875 875 
Adj. R2 0.196 0.343 0.144 
See Appendix A for variable definitions. Standard errors are clustered by firm. ***, **,* denote 













Table 5: Censorship of News related to Firms with Large Taxpayers 
Panel A: Firm Characteristics with and without PSM  
 Pre-PSM Post-PSM 
More Less Difference More Less Difference 
Tax 3.996×108 4.528×106 3.951×108*** 
(6.393) 
5.166×107 5.091×106 4.657×107*** 
(14.852) 
SOE 0.737 0.654 0.083*** 
(8.408) 
0.651 0.699 -0.048 
(-1.264) 
SIZE 21.622 20.620 1.002*** 
(49.326) 
20.648 20.638 0.010 
(0.216) 
ROA 0.034 0.007 0.027*** 
(19.151) 
-0.026 -0.030 0.004 
(0.764) 
BTM 1.107 0.851 0.256*** 
(16.814) 
0.860 0.908 -0.048 
(-1.314) 
LEVERAGE 0.510 0.503 0.007 
(1.621) 
0.628 0.639 -0.011  
(-0.673) 
OREC 0.049 0.079 -0.030*** 
(-17.749) 
0.176 0.174 0.002 
(0.293) 
Panel B: Regressions using the PSM Sample 







Large_Taxpayer -0.085*** -0.002 0.058 
 (-2.829) (-0.052) (0.972) 
Control Variables Included Included Included 
Year F.E Included Included Included 
Industry F.E Included Included Included 
Constant -1.376*** 0.077 -5.627*** 
 (-2.678) (0.099) (-4.838) 
#Obs 1335 1335 1335 
Adj R2 0.187 0.276 0.175 
See Appendix A for variable definitions. Standard errors are clustered by firm. The control variables 
are included but not tabulated for brevity. ***, **,* denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 








Table 6: Censorship of News at the Local Level (Out-of-Province versus In-
Province) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 



















SOE_Central -0.043*** -0.047* -0.040 -0.007 -0.009 -0.019 
 (-2.671) (-1.799) (-0.614) (-1.417) (-0.722) (-0.244) 
SOE_Provincial -0.019 -0.019 -0.039 -0.001 -0.010 0.042 
 (-1.461) (-0.873) (-0.891) (-0.308) (-1.155) (1.141) 
Control Variables Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year F.E Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry F.E Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant -0.310 0.435* -2.655*** -0.005 0.116 -3.191*** 
 (-1.526) (1.789) (-4.096) (-0.097) (0.487) (-3.304) 
# Obs. 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 
Adj. R2 0.090 0.114 0.269 0.023 0.053 0.225 
See Appendix A for variable definitions. Standard errors are clustered by firm. The control variables 
are included but not tabulated for brevity. ***, **,* denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
level using a two-tailed t-test. 
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Table 7: Capital-Market Effects of Tunneling News 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns 
  ABN_RET 
  Mean Std T-Value Difference from Day0 T-Value 
Day-10 0.0005 0.082 0.217 0.006
*** 2.638 
Day -9 -0.0003 0.026 -0.373 0.005
*** 4.895 
Day -8 -0.0018
** 0.027 -2.424 0.004*** 3.570 
Day -7 -0.0019
*** 0.026 -2.757 0.004*** 3.334 
Day -6 -0.0018
** 0.028 -2.367 0.004*** 3.328 
Day -5 -0.0019
** 0.027 -2.511 0.004*** 3.354 
Day -4 -0.0014
* 0.029 -1.834 0.004*** 3.608 
Day -3 -0.0027
*** 0.03 -3.377 0.003** 2.472 
Day -2 -0.0016 0.039 -1.511 0.004
*** 2.865 
Day -1 0.0011 0.112 0.352 0.007
** 2.135 
Day 0 -0.0057




** 0.03 -2.026 0.004*** 3.526 
Day +2 -0.0011 0.028 -1.412 0.005
*** 4.059 
Day +3 -0.0026
*** 0.028 -3.495 0.003*** 2.714 
Day +4 -0.0024
*** 0.028 -3.055 0.003*** 2.848 
Day +5 -0.0010 0.027 -1.372 0.004
*** 4.108 
Day +6 -0.0007 0.028 -0.874 0.005
*** 4.476 
Day +7 -0.0013
* 0.027 -1.758 0.004*** 3.902 
Day +8 0.0005 0.028 0.586 0.006
*** 5.210 
Day +9 -0.0022
*** 0.027 -2.935 0.004*** 3.050 
Day +10 -0.0006 0.027 -0.812 0.005




Panel B: Abnormal Trading Volumes and Market Depths 
  ABN_VOL ABN_DEPTH 
  Mean Std T-Value Difference from Day0 T-Value Mean Std T-Value Difference from Day0 T-Value 
Day-10 0.119
*** 0.798 5.489 -0.164*** -5.514  0.192*** 0.973 7.223 -0.298*** -6.683 
Day -9 0.125
*** 0.817 5.627 -0.158*** -5.351  0.186*** 1.022 6.677 -0.304*** -6.866 
Day -8 0.147
*** 0.871 6.188 -0.136*** -4.540  0.210*** 1.007 7.662 -0.280*** -6.479 
Day -7 0.142
*** 0.865 6.005 -0.141*** -4.826 0.193*** 0.983 7.207 -0.297*** -6.910 
Day -6 0.152
*** 0.89 6.257 -0.131*** -4.586 0.254*** 1.143 8.148 -0.236*** -5.320 
Day -5 0.175
*** 0.913 7.035 -0.108*** -3.924 0.237*** 1.125 7.725 -0.253*** -5.670 
Day -4 0.186
*** 0.95 7.184 -0.097*** -3.606 0.263*** 1.148 8.417 -0.227*** -5.235 
Day -3 0.184
*** 0.985 6.832 -0.099*** -3.881 0.254*** 1.161 8.015 -0.236*** -5.620 
Day -2 0.199
*** 1.002 7.267 -0.084*** -3.471 0.295*** 1.196 9.03 -0.195*** -4.555 
Day -1 0.235
*** 1.029 8.39 -0.048** -2.170 0.361*** 1.245 10.624 -0.129*** -3.440 
Day 0 0.283
*** 1.072 9.693 
 




*** 1.095 8.838 -0.019 -1.027 0.393*** 1.319 10.919 -0.097*** -3.030 
Day +2 0.260
*** 1.037 9.191 -0.023 -0.971 0.321*** 1.272 9.235 -0.169*** -4.394 
Day +3 0.249
*** 1.011 9.035 -0.034 -1.321 0.328*** 1.213 9.915 -0.162*** -4.113 
Day +4 0.262
*** 1.044 9.177 -0.021 -0.866 0.270*** 1.137 8.694 -0.220*** -5.546 
Day +5 0.235
*** 1.032 8.342 -0.048* -1.833 0.296*** 1.183 9.165 -0.196*** -4.679 
Day +6 0.250
*** 1.012 9.055 -0.033 -1.269 0.243*** 1.125 7.922 -0.247*** -5.966 
Day +7 0.229
*** 1.055 7.939 -0.054* -1.959 0.213*** 1.105 7.05 -0.280*** -6.529 
Day +8 0.271
*** 1.034 9.587 -0.012 -0.470 0.298*** 1.108 9.862 -0.192*** -4.316 
Day +9 0.246
*** 1.063 8.493 -0.037 -1.262 0.246*** 1.134 7.95 -0.244*** -5.461 
Day +10 0.205




Table 8: Selection of News Topics for Censorship 
 





















SOE -0.105*** -0.056** -0.022 -0.028 -0.049* -0.007 -0.035* 0.009 0.003 0.008 
 (-3.491) (-2.332) (-1.484) (-1.412) (-1.920) (-0.554) (-1.785) (0.709) (0.480) (1.447) 
Control 
Variables 
Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year F.E Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry F.E Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant -0.889** -0.252 0.463* 0.207 -0.407 0.009 0.750** -0.213 0.018 0.007 
 (-2.034) (-0.784) (1.883) (0.849) (-1.181) (0.058) (2.593) (-1.268) (0.351) (0.085) 
#Obs 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 
Adj. R2 0.174 0.112 0.046 0.157 0.167 0.034 0.091 0.048 0.013 0.018 
See Appendix A for variable definitions. Standard errors are clustered by firm. The control variables are included but not tabulated for brevity. ***, **,* denote 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level using a two-tailed t-test.
55 
 
Table 9: Incentives and Censorship of Official versus Commercial Newspapers 
Panel A: Censorship of Official versus Commercial Newspapers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Protection of SOEs Protection of  
Large Employers 




















SOE_Central -0.109*** -0.070**     
 (-3.236) (-2.211)     
SOE_Provincial -0.073*** -0.044*     
 (-2.810) (-1.877)     
Small_Employer   0.101*** 0.075***   
   (2.676) (2.939)   
Large_Taxpayer     -0.072*** -0.062*** 
     (-2.663) (-2.692) 
Control 
Variables 
Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year F.E Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry F.E Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant -0.664* -0.623** -1.690** -1.757*** -0.920** -1.126*** 
 (-1.675) (-2.025) (-2.033) (-3.274) (-1.971) (-2.845) 
# Obs 2,100 2,100 875 875 1335 1335 
Adj. R2 0.138 0.153 0.180 0.159 0.131 0.167 
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Panel B: Reporting of Tunneling News Driven by Abnormal Returns 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 




 Full Sample Non-SOE  SOE Non-SOE SOE 
Annual_ABN_RET -0.074*** -0.117*** -0.007 -0.087*** -0.036** 
 (-3.159) (-3.025) (-0.325) (-3.306) (-2.209) 
SOE -0.104***     
 (-3.194)     
Control Variables Included Included Included Included Included 
Year F.E Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry F.E Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant -1.032** -1.957*** -0.150 -1.161* -0.263 
 (-2.046) (-3.052) (-0.317) (-1.925) (-0.595) 
# Obs 1,919 760 1,159 760 1,159 
Adj. R2 0.166 0.157 0.131 0.147 0.160 
Test of Coefficient Difference 
Diff Z-Value Diff Z-Value 
-0.110** -2.479 -0.051* -1.647 
See Appendix A for variable definitions. In this regression, we use the same control variables as the 
other regressions, except for STD_RET (standard deviation of stock returns) because abnormal 
returns are our test variable. Standard errors are clustered by firm. ***, **,* denote significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level using a two-tailed t-test. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
